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A blockchain is a distributed, always
available, irreversible, and tamper­
resistant public database where the con­
trol over data and its evolution is distrib­
uted among a variable set of peers.
Blockchain technology does not require
the existence of trust relationships
among the system’s users.
Consequently, it employs a distributed
consensus algorithm to allow the users
to agree on immutable and auditable
append­only operation without requiring
interaction with a trusted third party. We
are interested in the auditability of the
data stored in the blockchain, since the
blockchain can be used as a publicly
verifiable proof that the data existed at
the time it was saved in it.
Access control systems are meant to reg­
ulate the access to critical or valuable
resources. Several access control
models, i.e., ways of defining the poli­
cies expressing the rights of subjects to
access resources, have been defined, and
here we focus on attribute­based access
control (ABAC) policies. An ABAC
policy combines a set of rules
expressing conditions over a set of
attributes paired to the subject, to the
resource or to the environment. The
rules must be satisfied accordingly in
order for the access right to be granted.
A well­known policy language to
express ABAC policies is the eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language
(XACML), defined by the OASIS con­
sortium.
Our proposal exploits blockchain tech­
nology as the base framework on top of
which we build an ABAC system. The
first step for defining our distributed
blockchain­based access control system
is to store the access control policies in
the blockchain. Depending on the under­
lying blockchain, different technical
solutions can be adopted. If the
blockchain allows for arbitrary data
storage, then we can save the policy
directly on it. On the contrary, if the
underlying blockchain has strict space
constraints, e.g., Bitcoin [1], we should
adopt more complex solutions, such as
storing links to the policies in the chain
while the complete policies are stored
elsewhere (e.g., in distributed hash
tables (DHT)). This is possible as long
as the storage system remains tamper­
proof and guarantees data availability,
and the linking to the policies is unique
and tamper­proof as well. Another
option is the one provided by the
Ethereum blockchain [2], which allows
smart contracts to be represented and
run. In this case, these smart contracts
can be exploited to properly encode the
policies themselves in executable
format. 
The next step of our approach is to
define the policy enforcement architec­
ture, i.e., to define the set of compo­
nents required to perform, at access
request time, the policy evaluation
against the current access context. If the
policy is not stored in the blockchain in
executable format, the architecture of
the enforcement system is similar to the
XACML reference one [1]. 
As an example, in [3] we described a
preliminary prototype of a blockchain­
based access control system which
exploits the Bitcoin blockchain and
XACML policies. In this case, since
Bitcoin was not designed to store arbi­
trary data, we defined a customised
strategy to compress the XACML poli­
cies and we exploited the OP_RETURN
script op code and MULTISIG transac­
tions to store them in the chain. The
attributes required at access request
time to perform the policy evaluation
can be retrieved from traditional
attribute providers (e.g., Lightweight
Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)
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We defined a distributed access control system on top of blockchain technology. The underlying idea
is to properly represent the access rights of the subjects in the blockchain in order to easily allow
their enforcement at access request time. By leveraging blockchain advantages we can add new
desired properties, such as auditability, to the access control system. To prove the feasibility and
validate the proposed approach we developed a proof of concept implementation and performed
some relevant experiments.
Figure 1: Architecture of the blockchain based access control framework.
legal, and may be sued if it fails to fulfil
its legal obligations.
In the absence of a central logging
facility that acts as a trusted third party,
and without sophisticated access to
appropriate management solutions, it
can be virtually impossible to trace
which partner organisations have
accessed individual data sets. It can,
therefore, be extremely difficult to pro­
vide relevant information to an indi­
vidual who requests that their data be
deleted. As a consequence, the pro­
cessing of personal data inside a consor­
tium might, in the future, be crimi­
nalised or result in a fine.
In 2016, The Luxembourg Institute of
Science and Technology, LIST [L2],
filed a patent application that addresses
these new demands with a solution
based on the latest file­distribution,
blockchain and encryption technolo­
gies. In a purely decentralised peer­to­
peer environment of equal partners,
without requiring any centralised
instance or further authorisation steps,
the solution empowers the provider of
data to trace the access to the data by
partners in the distributed and shared
data pool. This trace of access is
without any doubt and cannot be
denied. 
The solution is based on a file distribu­
tion network of encrypted files. It cre­
ates redundancy to increase availability
and to improve download speed (Figure
1). The blockchain network is used to
log the access to the files which will
allow every access of the data by any
Closed consortia who provide and
exchange personal data between their
partners need to understand the impact
that the new General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) of the European
Union will have on their processes. In
fact, it demands that the data controller
must provide to an individual, upon
request, information about the transfer
of their personal data to third parties,
third countries or international organisa­
tions.
The legal counterpart and single point of
contact for a person that provided their
personal data will not be the consortium
as a whole, but a single data controller
partner who has collected the private
data and published it in the data pool.
This contractual partner needs to ensure
that the processing of personal data is
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Blockchain Ensures Transparency in Personal
Data Usage: Being Ready for the New EU
General Data Protection Regulation
by Uwe Roth (Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology, LIST)
The new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1][L1], which will come into effect in 2018,
demands transparency as one of the main principles for the collection, processing, storing and
transfer of personal data. Transparency ensures that individuals can enforce their legal rights: to
withdraw consent for their personal data to be processed or to request that their data are erased. At
the Luxembourg Institute of Science and Technology we filed a patent, based on blockchain
technology, that guarantees transparency in the context of files that are exchanged in a shared data
pool. It guarantees that access by partners to specific files can be traced without a central entity.
services). However, we envisage that
attributes could be stored and managed
exploiting the blockchain as well. If the
policy is stored in the blockchain in exe­
cutable format, i.e., through smart con­
tracts, most of the policy enforcement
architecture is embedded in the
blockchain itself. Such smart contracts
represent self­evaluating policies that
can be queried directly and transpar­
ently at access request time. The attrib­
utes required for the evaluation of the
policy are encoded in the blockchain as
smart contract as well. We have devel­
oped a proof­of­concept implementa­
tion of this approach on the Ethereum
blockchain, demonstrating the feasi­
bility of our proposal.
The evaluation of a blockchain­based
access control policy could be performed
by a party which is not trusted by the
resource owner or by subject of the
request who, instead, would like to be
guaranteed against malicious or erroneous
policy evaluations. For instance, the party
that evaluates the policy and enforces the
result could maliciously force the system
to deny an access although the policy
would have granted it. 
Blockchain technology can be exploited
to address this problem as well, In fact,
having the policies and the attributes
publicly available through the
blockchain, allows any user to know at
any time the policies that are applicable
to its access request and the related
access context. This allows distributed
auditability, detecting parties that fraud­
ulently alter the rights granted by the
enforceable policies.
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